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Abstract
We analyze economic rationales for, and possible alternatives to, the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP). We identify various cross-country spillover eﬀects and domestic policy failures
as potential rationales. The two sets of problems suggest diﬀerent corrective measures, and
diﬀerent measures than those applied in the context of SGP. We contrast the “legalistic”
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11 Introduction
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is an attempt
at letting internationally agreed arrangements compensate for inadequate incentives of national
ﬁscal policy makers. As dramatically illustrated by the problems of implementing the SGP, such
arrangements may however be in conﬂict with the pursuit of other national policy targets, for
instance ambitions to dampen the business cycle, smooth tax distortions, or ﬁght unemployment.
In fact, a large early literature predicted that such conﬂicts had to arise at some point. What
is less clear, is whether (further) revisions of the SGP, or alternatives to the Pact, can mitigate
these conﬂicts, and what such revisions or alternatives might be.
Against this background, the paper makes two contributions, one analytical and one sub-
stantive. On the analytical side, we apply economic theory to identify rationales for the SGP
and to develop adequate policy responses in light of these rationales. We clarify the reasons
for the diﬃculties connected with the Pact in its current form, and we integrate various points
discussed in the literature into a coherent analytical framework. The analysis identiﬁes two po-
tential rationales for constraints on ﬁscal policy makers, related to cross-country spillover eﬀects
as well as domestic policy failures. We stress that these two rationales suggest diﬀerent correc-
tive measures, and diﬀerent measures than those currently applied under the SGP. In particular,
the most appealing response to spillover eﬀects is a system of corrective (Pigouvian) taxes. By
inducing decision makers to internalize international consequences of their policy choices, such
a system helps balance national policy objectives on the one hand and the ambition to correct
spillovers on the other. To address domestic policy failures, in contrast, corrective taxes are of
little use. But procedural rules or limited delegation of ﬁscal powers to fully accountable com-
mittees oﬀers a conceivable solution to the apparent conﬂict between the objective to counteract
policy failures and the need to allow for ﬂexibility.
On the substantive side, we highlight the “legalistic” perspective adopted in the SGP. We
argue that this legalistic perspective renders the Pact both ineﬀective and diﬃcult to enforce,
in contrast to an alternative perspective that stresses incentives. On one hand, the SGP’s
legalistic approach based on binding ceilings and punishments in case of violations of these
ceilings does not work towards achieving the desirable balance between national policy objectives
and the ambition to correct spillovers. On the other hand, the legalistic approach aggravates the
incentive problems that arise if politicians are supposed to enforce constraints in a discretionary
manner; in particular, the fact that governments are “punished” for violations of agreed-upon
rules creates unnecessary political drama.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we compare the incentives
of ﬁscal policy makers before and after the emergence of EMU, and we identify spillover eﬀects
and policy failures as potential problems with ﬁscal policy choices in EMU. In Section 3, we
discuss alternative arrangements to address these problems, and mechanisms for enforcing such
arrangements. Section 4 concludes. The appendix of the working paper version (Lindbeck and
Niepelt, 2005) contains a formal analysis of the framework underlying the discussion in Section 2.
2 Fiscal-Monetary Policy Interaction
Our objective in this section is to characterize the problems arising as a result of decentralized
ﬁscal policies in a world with interdependent national economies. For this purpose, we consider
the situation in Europe both before and after the introduction of the common monetary policy.
For analytical reasons, we also compare this situation to a hypothetical benchmark of fully
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the monetary union created new problems, or rather accentuated already existing ones.
In the following, we refer to these three scenarios as “EU” (the situation in the European
Union before the introduction of the monetary union), “EMU” (the situation in the European
Union after the introduction of the monetary union), and “benchmark” (a hypothetical situation
with internationally coordinated policy choices). Our discussion is based on a formal character-
ization of the incentive structure of policy agents in the benchmark, EU, and EMU as presented
in the appendix of the working paper version (Lindbeck and Niepelt, 2005).
We analyze a situation where national economies are interconnected and hence, where na-
tional ﬁscal or monetary policies inﬂuence economic outcomes in other countries. We shall say
that spillover eﬀects arise if the policy choices by one authority directly inﬂuence variables en-
tering in the objective function of other authorities. When policy makers move sequentially
(rather than simultaneously), we shall say that policy mediated spillover eﬀects arise if policy
choices by one authority indirectly inﬂuence variables entering in the objective function of other
authorities, via induced policy responses by third authorities.
2.1 Benchmark: International Policy Coordination
The benchmark reﬂects the hypothetical case of internationally coordinated decision making
by all ﬁscal and monetary authorities, aiming at maximizing some cross-country social welfare
function that aggregates the objective functions of all authorities, subject to optimizing behavior
of private agents. One way to think about this hypothetical social welfare function is as a
“compromise” including side payments. To make the benchmark comparable with the EU and
EMU scenarios analyzed below, we assume that policy makers cannot commit. To simplify the
exposition, we conﬁne the analysis of the interaction between ﬁscal and monetary authorities to
a single period. This is not very restrictive, since policy makers are allowed to “care” for state
variables at the end of the period. For example, policy makers may have preferences over the
stock of government debt at the end of the period to the extent that this debt aﬀects future
policy options and, hence, the welfare of households in the future.
Since all authorities are assumed to agree on the social welfare function, they fully internalize
the direct spillover eﬀects. If authorities moved sequentially, so that policy mediated spillover
eﬀects would arise as well, the latter would also be fully internalized (see the discussion in the
appendix of the working paper version (Lindbeck and Niepelt, 2005)). As a consequence, the
assumption about the timing of decision making is of no relevance when deﬁning the benchmark.
We conclude that in the hypothetical benchmark of international policy coordination, all spillover
eﬀects are fully internalized.
2.2 EU: Decentralized Fiscal and Monetary Policies
We characterize the situation before the introduction of the common monetary policy as decen-
tralized decision making by monetary and ﬁscal authorities without commitment. The assump-
tion that ﬁscal authorities cannot commit seems indisputable. After all, ﬁscal policies are at the
core of political controversies and bargaining in national politics, subject to majority rule. Our
parallel assumption with regard to central banks deserves further comment, however, given that
central banks in the pre EMU era seemed less inclined to implement expansionary policies than
the respective ﬁscal authorities. But this does not imply that central banks were committed
to decision rules. Rather, it conforms well with the view that delegation of monetary policy
3to Rogoﬀ (1985)-type “conservative” central bankers (with limited commitment like any other
oﬃcial) gave rise to the observed behavior.
We assume that central banks move after ﬁscal authorities, thereby capturing the notion
that central banks can adjust their instruments in a much more ﬂexible fashion. This does
not imply that central banks are forced to straighten out the macroeconomic mess that might
be left by ﬁscal policy makers. Since there is no commitment, and since there will be “later”
governments and central banks around, central bankers rather have the last word in each period;
more speciﬁcally, they have instruments available to determine inﬂation or exchange rates. (Of
course, the actual policy choice may be inﬂuenced by factors outside of their control. For
example, although central bankers may be fully in control of the inﬂation rate, the rate they
choose may nevertheless reﬂect concern for output stabilization or other objectives beyond price
stability.)
A ﬁscal policy maker is now assumed to maximize his objective function subject to the
expected policy choices by all other ﬁscal authorities and the expected policy responses by all
national central banks. As a consequence of ﬁscal authorities’ conﬂicting interests, neither direct
nor indirect spillover eﬀects are fully internalized. (See the ﬁrst-order conditions (1) and (2) in
the appendix of the working paper version (Lindbeck and Niepelt, 2005) for a comparison of the
incentive structures of ﬁscal policy makers in the benchmark and EU cases, respectively.) This
has three consequences:1
i. Undesirable cross-country redistribution due to non-internalized general equilibrium eﬀects
(so-called pecuniary externalities);
ii. eﬃciency losses due to non-internalized demand externalities if nominal prices or wages
are sticky, reﬂected in output gaps and unemployment;
iii. eﬃciency losses due to the fact that non-atomistic authorities exploit their market pow-
ers in order to manipulate general equilibrium eﬀects (eﬃciency losses due to strategic
interaction).2
Eﬃciency losses do not only arise due to the diﬀerent policy objectives of authorities. Other
complications result from domestic agency problems. It is well known that politicians do not
necessarily act in the best interest of society at large, in particular because the electorate is not
fully informed about the content and consequences of policies actually pursued. These agency
problems are aggravated by the fact that citizens have conﬂicting interests, and politicians
themselves also have a limited knowledge about the functioning of the economy. As suggested
by a large literature on domestic policy failure, ﬁscal policy choices are therefore likely to be
ineﬃcient, even in the absence of spillover eﬀects and strategic interaction at the international
level.3
1Evaluated by the cross-country social welfare function, the hypothetical policy choices in the benchmark
implement an allocation on the (second-best) Pareto frontier. Since the decentralized equilibrium must satisfy
additional incentive compatibility constraints, it must rank weakly lower than the benchmark case, if evaluated
according to this objective function. If, in contrast, the welfare comparison between the two equilibria is based on
the preferences of individual policy makers, the outcome in EU must be weakly worse for at least one authority.
In fact, all authorities may potentially rank the decentralized equilibrium lower than the benchmark allocation,
due to deadweight losses.
2Dixit and Lambertini (2001) analyze the strategic interaction between a common central bank and national
ﬁscal authorities with diﬀerent inﬂation and output bliss points.
3See the literature that originated with the contributions of the Public Choice School, in particular Buchanan
and Tullock (1962) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980). For a review of the literature, see Mueller (1989).
42.3 EMU: Decentralized Fiscal Policies, Centralized Monetary Policy
We characterize the situation after the introduction of EMU as decentralized decision making in
the ﬁscal ﬁeld, combined with centralized monetary policy (once more without commitment)—
with the European Central Bank (ECB) replacing national central banks. In the ﬁrst stage, all
national ﬁscal authorities move simultaneously, while the ECB follows in the second stage.
With national central banks replaced by the ECB, and the ECB pursuing an objective func-
tion accounting for the eﬀects on the whole EMU area, the character of policy conﬂicts changes.
The policy choice by a ﬁscal policy maker is now assumed to maximize his objective function,
subject to the policy choices by all other ﬁscal authorities and the expected policy response
by the ECB (see the ﬁrst-order conditions (2) and (3) in the appendix of the working paper
version (Lindbeck and Niepelt, 2005)). Moreover, the economic environment, including the type
and strength of the direct spillover eﬀects, also changes character. More speciﬁcally, pecuniary
externalities become more pronounced to the extent that a speciﬁc government’s borrowing in
Euro bonds more strongly aﬀects the interest rate of other national Euro debtors than when
national capital markets are segmented by national currencies. The pecuniary externalities also
become stronger if unsophisticated investors do not properly diﬀerentiate between the default
risk of diﬀerent countries, as long as they issue their debt in Euros, thereby driving up the
cost of funds for more responsible governments.4 Demand externalities become stronger as
well, since the common currency fosters cross-border market integration, boosting international
interdependence.
The changes in the character and strength of policy conﬂicts and direct spillover eﬀects imply
that the policy mediated spillover eﬀects change as well. In particular, policy responses by the
ECB to the developments in any member state have immediate implications for the monetary
conditions in the whole EMU area. Depending on which ﬁscal variables the ECB responds to,
various policy mediated spillover eﬀects may now be present, giving rise to distorted ﬁscal policy
choices (relative to the benchmark or EU) and deadweight losses.5 For instance, expansionary
ﬁscal policy in one country may increase the average inﬂation rate in the EMU area, inducing the
ECB to raise interest rates with consequences for all member countries. Similar consequences
may arise if the ECB responds to an EMU wide cost-push shock by raising the interest rate, and
individual governments run expansionary ﬁscal policies to mitigate the eﬀects of the monetary
contraction. This in turn might induce the ECB to raise interest rates even further. Deadweight
losses arise because ﬁscal policy makers do not account for the negative consequences of this
further interest hike on the objectives of other ﬁscal policy makers. In equilibrium, ﬁscal policy
in each country is expansionary, but output remains depressed due to the ECB’s contractionary
policy stance.6
Other policy mediated spillover eﬀects may arise if the ECB cannot credibly commit to
uphold its inﬂation target. For instance, ﬁscal policy makers might anticipate the ECB to
soften its monetary policy stance in response to rising debt levels, in order to depreciate the
real value of the outstanding debt or to stimulate the economy that is depressed as a result of
high distorting taxes (required to pay for the debt service). In consequence, ﬁscal policy makers
4A recent warning by the ECB not to accept sovereign debt of low-rated government bonds as collateral would,
if implemented, accentuate the risk-premium of such bonds. This would mitigate the eﬀect described in the text.
5If the ECB responds to EMU wide averages of variables, it will react more strongly to policy choices by large
countries than by small countries. Taken by itself, this means that ﬁscal policy makers in small countries are less
likely to internalize the eﬀects of their actions on EMU-wide monetary conditions.
6See Uhlig (2002). In contrast to most spillover eﬀects proposed in the literature, this eﬀect suggests a critical
role for deﬁcits as opposed to government debt.
5may be tempted to issue more Euro denominated debt, or debt in other denomination, than in
the EU case.7 Deadweight losses arise because individual governments do not take the negative
consequences of higher equilibrium inﬂation in other countries into account. If not only policy
makers, but also investors, correctly anticipate the ECB’s response, it has no “real” eﬀects, but
simply results in an inﬂationary bias similar to the one analyzed by Barro and Gordon (1983):
Equilibrium inﬂation is pushed to the level where the ECB is no longer willing to further devalue
outstanding debt or stimulate the economy at the cost of higher inﬂation. As a consequence, all
ﬁscal policy makers (and the ECB) end up being worse oﬀ.
A similar type of policy mediated spillover eﬀect due to lack of commitment arises if the
ECB is expected to act as a lender of last resort and purchase public debt from the banking
system, say, whenever the prospect of an imminent sovereign default leads to a liquidity crisis.8
In that case, the ECB’s response has real eﬀects since, eﬀectively, part of the burden of the
crisis country’s public debt is borne by other member states. As a consequence, a common-pool
problem arises: Anticipating the course of action, ﬁscal authorities once more issue too much
public debt and equilibrium inﬂation expectations rise, fueled by the anticipation of a monetary
bail out.
The move from EU to EMU also aﬀects domestic ﬁscal policy failure. First, two watchdogs
against policy failures—domestic central banks and international foreign exchange markets—
disappear, thereby discouraging responsible ﬁscal policies. Second, the abolition of national
monetary policies removes possibilities for mitigating the costs of domestic policy failures by way
of monetary policy interventions, thereby encouraging responsible ﬁscal policies. Consider ﬁrst
the watchdog issue. Absent national monetary policy, ﬁscal authorities are freer to overheat or
depress the economy, generating higher macroeconomic volatility. Moreover, the role of ﬁnancial
markets as watchdogs on domestic ﬁscal policies changes character. In EU, market expectations
of “irresponsible” ﬁscal policies were rapidly reﬂected in the exchange rate, presumably because
investors expected national monetary policies to accommodate ﬁscal problems, with depreciation
as a result. The threat of such immediate market responses on the foreign exchange market
probably deterred some irresponsible policies in the ﬁrst place. In EMU, this threat no longer
looms because exchange rates are ﬁxed. With price reactions to ﬁscal policy choices thus conﬁned
to the bond market, the incentives for “responsible” ﬁscal policies tend to fall.
Turning to the second point, the abolishment of national central banks eliminates a domestic
lender of last resort with powers to inﬂate away nominal government debt in times of crisis, for
instance when the debt level seriously threatens intergenerational equity objectives. Since the
ECB is less likely to intervene in response to a national crisis than a domestic central bank,
the move from EU to EMU might strengthen the incentives of national ﬁscal policy makers for
prudent ﬁscal policy choices. Similarly, the abolition of national monetary policies under EMU
eliminates the option to devalue as a ﬁnal escape route. This also tends to restrain govern-
ments (and unions) from pursuing inﬂationary policies, since such policies have contractionary
(and thus unemployment creating) eﬀects on the tradeable sector, if devaluations are no longer
feasible.9
The move from EU to EMU thus has various, and potentially opposing, consequences for
7See Chari and Kehoe (2004) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) for models illustrating these points.
8See Uhlig (2002). He also discusses how the incentives for prudent bank regulation are aﬀected when the
ECB becomes the lender of last resort.
9In those countries whose central banks under the EU regime strictly pegged their currencies to the D-Mark
and therefore had no ﬂexibility in their monetary policy choices, the move from EU to EMU would tend to reduce
the sensitivity of monetary conditions to (ﬁscal) developments to a lesser extent.
6the extent of domestic policy failure and thus for macroeconomic stability and intergenerational
redistribution. The net eﬀects are unclear from a theoretical point of view. Nor is the empirical
evidence conclusive. Fat´ as and Mihov (2003) report signs of a “fatigue” in ﬁscal consolidation
eﬀorts after the introduction of the common monetary policy in 1999. But it remains unclear
whether this fatigue is related to changed incentives and/or a lack of enforcement (see Subsection
3.3), or rather represents a reaction to the preceding exceptional eﬀorts to qualify for EMU
membership.
How important are these potential problems in EMU? The prevalence and importance of
domestic policy failure is widely acknowledged. In contrast, there is less consensus on the im-
portance of direct spillover eﬀects of ﬁscal policies; to the extent that these direct spillover eﬀects
exist, however, it seems plausible that the move from EU to EMU made them quantitatively
more important. In any case, policy mediated spillover eﬀects transmitted by monetary pol-
icy responses may arise independently of direct spillover eﬀects, and as we have argued before,
changes in such policy induced spillover eﬀects may be regarded as the major qualitative dif-
ference between the EU and EMU regimes. One type of policy mediated spillover eﬀects is a
direct consequence of the ECB’s mandate to pursue area-wide price stability. The other type,
in contrast, only arises if the ECB lacks credibility in pursuing this mandate. In our view,
the ECB can neither commit, nor is it perfectly insulated against political pressures to pursue
objectives in conﬂict with their inﬂation target. To the extent that ﬁscal policy makers exploit
these features of central bank behavior, an inﬂationary bias or a dynamic common-pool problem
might arise. Under the alternative assumption that the ECB can actually commit, and is only
concerned about inﬂation, the threat of an inﬂationary bias or dynamic common-pool problems
disappears.
Regardless of whether international repercussions are quantitatively important, politicians
seem to have taken their existence seriously when conceiving of the SGP. A cynic might say that
their arguments were simply excuses for ambitions to keep certain countries, such as Italy or
Greece, outside of EMU—an attempt to keep the “bad apples out of the EMU basket.” But this
argument triggers the question why policy makers wanted to block the access for these countries,
if not for the reason that they regarded international repercussions as important.
3 Corrective Mechanisms
We have identiﬁed two potential problems concerning ﬁscal policy choices in EMU, one related
to various spillover eﬀects, the other to domestic policy failures. We now turn to the pros and
cons of alternative methods to deal with these problems.
3.1 Dealing with Spillover Eﬀects
The natural solution to problems associated with a lack of international policy coordination is,
of course, to coordinate. In practice, however, intergovernmental coordination that is suﬃciently
far-reaching to internalize all spillover eﬀects would create a number of new problems, for ex-
ample, the danger of coordinated actions against the ECB, a point made by Giavazzi (2004).
More generally, the substantial transfers of power to oﬃcials required for successful coordination
bear signiﬁcant risks, in particular of abuse of power and of misjudgement due to insuﬃcient
information among decision makers (a Hayek-type argument). The obvious way of minimizing
these risks is to limit government intervention on the supra-national level to those issues for
which coordination is expected to be particularly beneﬁcial. Such partial coordination might
7be a more “robust” arrangement than far-reaching coordination, since it limits the danger of
large-scale political failure. Moreover, limited coordination is in better accord with visions of
decentralization of power, citizens’ political participation, and political accountability.10
In principle, a system of elaborate Pigouvian taxes (plus transfers) is an alternative to far-
reaching policy coordination.11 However, such an “ideal” Pigouvian tax system is subject to
similar types of problems as far-reaching coordination. The same robustness argument would
therefore point to a more limited Pigouvian system than the “ideal” system that strives to
implement the hypothetical benchmark outcome.
Such a more limited Pigouvian system would tax (subsidize) those policy outcomes consid-
ered to be at the source of the most important spillover eﬀects to other countries. What these
variables are, depends on the type of spillover. From a cross-country redistribution point of view,
the public debt level may be particularly relevant, since it aﬀects the cost of debt service across
countries. From the demand externality point of view, output gaps (in Euros) are particularly
relevant, since they are connected to direct spillover eﬀects via trade. Finally, from the point of
view of strategic interaction with the ECB, the public debt level is particularly relevant, since a
high debt level increases the incentive for the ECB to loosen its monetary policy stance, as dis-
cussed earlier.12 Negative output gaps (in Euros), deﬁcits (in Euros) or inﬂation rates (weighted
by GDP) may also be relevant bases for Pigouvian taxes, to the extent that they trigger contrac-
tionary monetary policy responses by the ECB that aﬀect all member countries. Theoretically,
taxes on these various “sources” of spillover eﬀects are equivalent to (sets of) taxes on other
variables closely linked to the sources. However, these links are not always well understood, nor
are they likely to be reasonably stable over time. A robustness argument therefore implies that
the Pigouvian taxes should apply as directly as possible to the sources of what are considered
to be the most important spillovers.
In principle, the tax rates imposed under this limited Pigouvian system should reﬂect the
external social marginal costs of the implemented policies, inducing governments to internalize
the spillover eﬀects of their actions and allocating debt, deﬁcits, output gaps, or other sources
of spillovers to those countries where their social value is highest (or the social cost is lowest).
Since the system would generally result in an unbalanced budget, the surplus or deﬁcit would
have to be distributed among member countries.
There is a close parallel between a Pigouvian tax system and a system based on marketable
permits assigning the right to conduct policies resulting in spillover eﬀects—a mechanism pro-
posed by Casella (1999) for allocating budget deﬁcits among countries. In such a system, the
total amount of permits is ﬁxed by the supra-national authority, and each country obtains an
initial endowment of permits. Trading of permits then takes place, and market prices adjust
to equilibrate the demand and supply for the permits. The resulting equilibrium allocation is
identical to the allocation under the Pigouvian tax system, if both systems generate the same
10This argument is diﬀerent from the “subsidiarity principle”, according to which centralization is acceptable
only if it yields better solutions to the problems at hand. Our point rather relates to the trade-oﬀ between
gains from coordination and the loss of other values, such as decentralization of power and national political
accountability.
11By Pigouvian taxes, we mean marginal taxes (subsidies) of the same size as marginal negative (positive)
externalities.
12Taxes on a country’s debt level might appear problematic, due to large variations in the debt level across
countries, and diﬃculties in aﬀecting the debt level within a reasonably short time. Nevertheless, the debt level
should be taxed if considered to be an important source of spillover eﬀects. At the same time, however, countries
with high debt levels could receive lump sum transfers. In this way, the income eﬀects of the tax could be
neutralized without forgoing the desired incentive eﬀects.
8incentive and wealth eﬀects, i.e., if (i) the Pigouvian tax rates are identical to the market clear-
ing prices and (ii) each country’s net tax payments under the Pigouvian system are identical to
its net expenditure on permits under the tradeable permit system.
An important and delicate question relates to who should have the authority to set the
Pigouvian tax rates or the quotas in a permit-based system. To have the interests of all countries
involved considered, authority should rest with a body composed of representatives of all member
countries. This could be the European Parliament, the Council, or the Commission. These
bodies could of course decide to delegate the task of assessing the severity of spillovers in a given
year to a group of experts.
In practice, Pigouvian taxes or tradeable permits, even in limited form, would be connected
with serious problems. First, some of the source variables of spillover eﬀects, for instance un-
employment rates and output gaps, are notoriously diﬃcult to measure. It may therefore be
necessary to conﬁne the tax bases to variables that are easier to measure, such as country-level
inﬂation, budget deﬁcits, and debt levels. Second, it is practically not feasible to solve the com-
plex optimization problem required to determine the tax rates or number of permits, that would
accurately reﬂect the external social marginal costs of spillovers. Tax rates or permit quantities,
as well as the distribution of tax revenue or initial permit endowments, would therefore have to
be determined in a more ad-hoc fashion, possibly by trial and error. One drastic simpliﬁcation
would be to impose the same Pigouvian tax rate on a particular variable in all countries.13 In
the tradeable permits case, this would correspond to a single (multilateral) rather than many
(bilateral) markets for permits on that particular variable. This approach would be particularly
natural, if demand externalities and problems of strategic interaction are considered to arise in
proportion to the EMU average of particular variables. Indeed, this appears to be a reasonable
approximation in the case of demand externalities arising from output gaps, and an even more
reasonable approximation in the case of the eﬀects working via policy responses of the ECB.
Another simpliﬁcation concerns the distribution of the surpluses of Pigouvian programs or, al-
ternatively, of the initial endowments of tradeable permits. A politically feasible scheme might
be distributions in proportion to the GDP of each country.
While a Pigouvian tax system is theoretically equivalent to a tradeable permits system, in-
formational limitations imply that the former is likely to be more operational than the latter.
Take, for example, the case of permits for deﬁcits, as suggested by Casella (1999). Since gov-
ernments only have imperfect control over the size of their deﬁcits during a given ﬁscal year
(and indeed do not know the exact outcome until after the end of that year), they may have
incentives to either accumulate excessive permits for precautionary reasons, or take the risk
of ending a period with fewer permits than required. To address the latter point, the system
might be extended to allow for ex-post markets for permits, or intertemporal trade in deﬁcits.
This, in turn, would require additional safeguards, for example progressive fees as suggested by
Casella, to avoid that governments exploit the option of intertemporally substituting permits.
Otherwise, the intended inﬂuence over contemporaneous deﬁcits would easily be lost. A basic
weakness of the permit-based approach therefore is that it requires additional actions to deal
with governments running larger deﬁcits than consistent with their permits; this problem does
not arise in the case of Pigouvian taxes. Another problem with the permit solution is that large
countries may act oligopolistically in the market for permits. This problem could also be avoided
13Such an outcome would also be expected for political reasons. Political factors render it very diﬃcult to
explicitly diﬀerentiate institutional constraints across countries although, as will be discussed subsequently, the
implementation of established constraints may diﬀer across countries, for instance due to unequal political bar-
gaining powers.
9under a system of Pigouvian taxes where the regulating authority does not lose direct control
over the price/tax on the activity to be regulated.
Could the SGP, in fact, be characterized as a primitive form of corrective tax system?
After all, one might interpret ﬁnes in connection with violations of the SGP as taxes meant to
increase the costs of certain actions rather than completely deterring them. In our view, the
SGP compares unfavorably with a proper Pigouvian tax system. The basic reason is that the
Pact’s incentive structure is asymmetric by punishing deﬁcits without rewarding surpluses,14
and also discontinuous since it imposes zero marginal costs of deﬁcits except at some speciﬁc
deﬁcit quotas, starting with three percent. The SGP therefore does not even approximately
induce an equalization of the marginal costs and beneﬁts of deﬁcit reduction across countries.
Moreover, the Pact deals with only two (and in eﬀect, mainly one) variable while other factors
such as domestic inﬂation might be at the source of equally important spillover eﬀects.
The background for the Pact’s poor incentive structure is most likely a legalistic view, where
ﬁnes are seen as punishments, designed to deter the violation of strictly binding ceilings. Ac-
cording to this view, it is “more natural” to forbid certain actions and punish violations than to
inﬂuence behavior via the price system. From that perspective, corrective taxes might also be
regarded as interfering “too strongly” with national policies. Neither view is convincing—the
ﬁrst because it neglects the eﬃciency losses due to discrepancies between marginal costs and
beneﬁts of adjustments in policy, the second because it is far from obvious that taxes more
severely restrain national autonomy than ﬁxed ceilings such as those embodied in the SGP.
So far, we have discussed possibilities to counteract spillover eﬀects—direct ones as well
as indirect ones induced by policy changes of the ECB. Of course, rather than counteracting
spillover eﬀects of the latter type, one might opt for a monetary policy regime designed to
eliminate their sources all together. To the extent that these sources, as discussed earlier, relate
to a lack of credibility on the part of the ECB, creating such credibility would eliminate, or at
least mitigate, the problem.
3.2 Dealing with Domestic Policy Failures
Since asymmetric information is at the heart of the principal-agent problems between politicians
and citizens in a representative democracy, enhancing transparency and information is a natural
way of addressing domestic policy failures. Indeed, much of the literature on national policy
failures addresses the issue of improving the transparency of domestic policy making. For ex-
ample, Fat´ as, Hughes Hallett, Sibert, Strauch and von Hagen (2003) have proposed to create a
“Sustainability Council for EMU” with the task to report its assessment of member states’ ﬁscal
policies to the public and the European Parliament. To boost media coverage and thus public
discussion, the Sustainability Council should also report its assessment to the relevant national
parliament and government. Moreover, the latter could even be obliged by law to respond in
written form to the report. Since reforms along those lines may not be suﬃcient, we will discuss
additional potentially useful devices.
Policy failure can be interpreted as a form of externality from politician’s actions on society
at large. At ﬁrst sight, this may suggest Pigouvian taxation as the optimal corrective approach,
in parallel to our previous reasoning on how to deal with international spillovers. In contrast
to the case of international spillovers, however, Pigouvian taxes should then have to be paid
by politicians rather than countries. As this is clearly not feasible, a second-best solution may
14To the extent that ﬁnes are refunded to countries that did not violate the constraints, there is some weak
form of symmetry.
10be that countries instead pay Pigouvian taxes to an international authority, so as to indirectly
inﬂuence politicians’ behavior. Pigouvian taxes designed to mitigate international spillover
eﬀects may therefore help mitigate domestic policy failure as well, in the sense of tending to
“work in the right direction” also for the latter problem if politicians are not indiﬀerent about
the eﬀect of the corrective tax on the government’s budget. In general, however, international
spillover eﬀects and domestic policy failure will require diﬀerent corrective measures.
Another approach is to impose restrictions directly constraining politicians’ behavior. These
restrictions could either be of a procedural type, with the consequence, for example, of strength-
ening the powers of parliamentary budget committees or the treasury in the budget process;
or they could directly constrain some ﬁscal policy instruments or outcomes, for example by
imposing ceilings on expenditure levels or budget deﬁcits.15
In the presence of a spending or deﬁcit bias, there is a clear case for procedural restrictions.
Constraints on policy instruments or outcomes, in contrast, are more problematic. Although
expenditure ceilings tend to strengthen the powers of the treasury relative to the spending
departments, which might be useful, such constraints can easily be circumvented by creative
book keeping or by switching from transfers to tax concessions. More importantly, constraints
on ﬁscal instruments or outcomes such as in the SGP impinge on the possibility to use ﬁscal policy
in a ﬂexible manner, which could create high costs for society. To minimize the corresponding
cost-beneﬁt ratio, constraints should only be attached to the most appropriate variables, and in
a way that minimally interferes with the ability to pursue other legitimate policy objectives.
As argued by many authors, the constraints embodied in the SGP are unlikely to satisfy this
eﬃciency requirement. One reason is that the constraints might prevent the automatic stabilizers
from working in the most desirable fashion. They might also crowd out public investment,
prevent tax smoothing or stabilizing discretionary demand management policies or, indeed,
induce a ﬁscal contraction in the midst of a recession by the requirement to reduce deﬁcits or
the debt quota.16 It has also been argued that the SGP embodies asymmetric incentives (since
it does not give incentives to behave “well” as opposed to avoiding “bad” behavior); that it only
considers government debt, not assets; and that it does not account for implicit government
debt such as social security obligations.17
In light of these criticisms, the literature includes a number of proposals for alternative
constraints on ﬁscal policy makers. For instance, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) have argued
that there is a case for constraining deﬁcits net of public investment in order to reduce the
risk that the SGP may crowd out government investment.18 Other authors have suggested to
15For instance, the Swedish budget process includes expenditure ceilings which are determined before the
allocation of funds to speciﬁc government departments. In the U.S., the congressional budget committee holds
particularly strong powers. In the U.K., the government has adopted principles of ﬁscal management enshrined
in a “Code for Fiscal Stability.”
16See, for example, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993), European Economic
Advisory Group (2003), or Fat´ as and Mihov (2003) for discussions. Naturally, these arguments assume, that ﬁscal
stabilization policy is, on balance, useful. While there is a broad consensus on this issue with respect to automatic
stabilizers, there is controversy on whether discretionary ﬁscal policy also contributes to macroeconomic stability.
The latter is probably true in extreme recessions or booms, while experience suggests that ﬁne-tuning of the
business cycle is rather hazardous. See also European Economic Advisory Group (2003) for a discussion of ﬁscal
stabilization policy.
17The notion of generational accounting is designed to incorporate the two latter considerations, see Auerbach
and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). Another problem with the SGP relates to the improper treatment of inﬂation: The nominal
deﬁcit, divided by the price level overstates the real deﬁcit since it neglects the inﬂation induced depreciation of
real government debt.
18Allowing governments to ﬁnance productive public investment by bond issues rather than by taxation may
11tie the Pact’s constraints to alternative deﬁcit measures, or to use combined measures of the
government’s ﬁnancial position that link the deﬁcit and the debt quota. In particular, some
proposals argue in favor of constraining the cyclically adjusted deﬁcit or the average budget
deﬁcit over the business cycle; other proposals would let countries with smaller debt quotas run
larger deﬁcit quotas (European Economic Advisory Group, 2003; Commission of the European
Communities, 2004), or allow countries to run (larger) deﬁcits only if they recorded suﬃciently
high surpluses during the last few preceding years.19
Some of these proposals would presumably need amendments. For constraints on medium-
run or accumulated budget deﬁcits need not induce governments to run surpluses in “good”
times if these governments are myopic or expect to be replaced. They might rather give rise to a
situation where subsequent governments are forced to pursue restrictive ﬁscal policies even during
a recession. A medium-run deﬁcit constraint may therefore come in conﬂict with ambitions to
stabilize the economy—even more so than a period-by-period deﬁcit constraint. The Pact’s
requirement that governments run budget surpluses during booms might mitigate this problem.
Some of the concerns mentioned earlier are (partly) addressed by the SGP since it includes
a number of escape clauses according to which corrections of deﬁcits may be delayed. Indeed,
these escape clauses have recently been considerably widened under the revised SGP in 2005
(Calmfors, 2005). On one hand, this means that the Pact has become less rigid and more
accommodating to speciﬁc circumstances, including prolonged recessions. On the other hand,
however, the Pact has become even more diﬃcult to enforce—an issue to which we return.
Delegation of authority constitutes an alternative to direct restrictions on policy makers’
choices. In contrast, for example, to rigid ceilings, delegation has the advantage of allowing for
ﬂexibility because all available information can be accounted for at the time decisions are taken.
At the same time, it does not jeopardize ambitions to counteract policy failures as long as the
agents in charge face appropriate incentives.
For instance, delegation of monetary policy to a Rogoﬀ (1985)-type conservative central
banker has not only helped mitigate problems of time-inconsistency, but also reduce the inﬂu-
ence of party politics in national monetary policy. In a parallel fashion, some limited delegation
of ﬁscal policy might reduce the extent of policy failure by mitigating the risks of pronounced
political business cycles or counteracting tendencies towards “unsustainable” policies, i.e., poli-
cies that drastically redistribute wealth from future to current generations. In spite of these
similarities, the delegation of ﬁscal policy is necessarily quite a diﬀerent matter than delegation
of monetary policy since one fundamental purpose of ﬁscal policy is to allocate resources and
distribute income in accordance with voters’ preferences. In other words, ﬁscal policy is at the
core of the democratic process, to a much larger extent than monetary policy. This implies that
the possibility of delegation to agencies outside the political sphere is much more limited for
ﬁscal policy than for monetary policy. Delegation of the latter generally involves a hand-over of
all relevant instruments to an administratively independent central bank (although governments
have prescribed the general policy targets and, in some countries, even the numerical target such
as a certain rate of inﬂation). Delegation of ﬁscal policy cannot go that far, but it can go some
way.20
induce contemporary voters to account more for the welfare of future generations. See Bassetto and Sargent
(2004) for a formal analysis of this point.
19In contrast to the proposal by the European Economic Advisory Group (2003) to condition the deﬁcit con-
straint on the level of debt, the latter proposal implies that ﬁscal policy is not constrained by budgetary decisions
in the distant past.
20See the discussion of this issue in European Economic Advisory Group (2003).
12A very limited type of ﬁscal policy delegation would be to create a ﬁscal policy committee
forecasting the budget outlook (similar to the Congressional Budget Oﬃce in the U.S.) and
oﬃcially recommending the general ﬁscal stance, for instance regarding the size of the budget
deﬁcit. Harden and von Hagen (1994) as well as Wyplosz (2002) make a much more far-
reaching proposal, arguing that ﬁscal policy committees should be given an explicit mandate of
ensuring debt sustainability and powers to limit annual government deﬁcits by law. Since deﬁcits
cannot be controlled directly, however, the ﬁscal policy committee would then have to propose
alternative combinations of ﬁscal policy instruments that satisfy (in the committee’s view) the
deﬁcit ceiling, and the government would have to choose among these proposals. Similarly far-
reaching are suggestions to allow ﬁscal policy committees to scale tax rates and/or spending
levels up or down from their politically determined base values (see the discussion in European
Economic Advisory Group, 2003). In the special case where the same scaling factor applies to
all taxes and all types of government spending, politicians would largely retain control over the
structure of taxation, subsidies, and government spending, and thus the control over Musgrave’s
(1959) distribution and allocation branches of ﬁscal policy. Control over the macroeconomic
stabilization branch, in contrast, would be handed over to the ﬁscal policy committee. Whatever
form such partial delegation of ﬁscal policy may take—and political considerations suggest that
it is unlikely to go very far—the members of ﬁscal policy committees would in any case have
to be accountable to political authorities, in the same way as operationally independent central
banks.
As mentioned before, corrective taxation on the supranational level requires some interna-
tional arrangement to determine, collect and potentially redistribute the proceeds from these
taxes. In contrast, measures to correct domestic policy failure do not necessarily require any
international involvement since they can, in principle, be implemented by domestic legislation.
To give these measures any “bite”, however, they must be diﬃcult to reverse, i.e., in Buchanan
and Tullock’s (1962) terminology, they need to be enacted on a “constitutional” level. If this
is not possible because national policy failure extends to the constitutional level, then inter-
nationally imposed constraints may play a substitute role as credible self-disciplinary devices.
Like the GATT, WTO, and many other international agreements, the SGP may be regarded as
such a reﬂection of policy makers’ willingness to tie their own hands in ﬁscal policy matters by
internationally agreed rules. In that view, the launch of EMU oﬀered a “window of opportu-
nity” to impose the SGP as an external commitment mechanism (European Economic Advisory
Group, 2003), and let EMU-wide institutions serve as a “ﬁscal backbone” for countries with
weak institutions (Buiter et al., 1993).21 22
With regard to delegation of authority, constitutional failure gives rise to two distinct dimen-
sions along which supranational involvement might be beneﬁcial: Not only might delegation be
imposed by a supranational arrangement, but countries may also choose to delegate ﬁscal policy
decisions to supranational bodies. In fact, some governments may actually ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
21Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) propose a diﬀerent explanation for the link between EMU and the SGP. They
argue that the common currency is a prerequisite to render the enforcement of constraints on ﬁscal policy makers
of the kind implemented in the SGP time consistent. According to Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), countries have
incentives to enforce deﬁcit constraints on other countries, only if they are harmed by deﬁcits in those countries
which they argue to be the case under a common currency.
22The extent of domestic constitutional failure and thus, the need for supranational involvement, presum-
ably varies between countries. According to Eichengreen (2004), the—internationally imposed—SGP constraints
should therefore only apply to those countries that are unable to pursue sound ﬁscal policies on their own (as
judged by an independent expert committee). Eichengreen (2004) proposes three measures of sustainability: the
presence of “appropriate ﬁscal institutions”, “limited future pension liabilities”, and ﬂexible labor markets.
13to have their hands tight by international agreements since this may increase their bargaining
power within the country. The IMF, the WTO, not to speak of the EU itself all are examples
where governments have accepted a loss of national sovereignty combined with delegation of
economic powers to an international body.
3.3 Enforcement
Nationally or supranationally imposed constraints on budget policies will not be eﬀective in
the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms triggering sanctions in case of violations of
the constraints. Two incentive-compatibility constraints must be satisﬁed to achieve credibility.
First, the authorities in charge of implementing the sanctions against violators must have the
incentive to do so ex post. Second, the violator must prefer to accept the punishment over
bearing the consequences of not doing so.
Regarding the authority in charge of imposing the sanctions, the degree of discretion is
crucial. At one extreme, the decision to impose sanctions might be made by a political body. In
this case, incentive problems will typically be severe because the implementation of the sanction
constitutes just one among many issues dealt with by this body. This opens the gate for complex
compromises (“log-rolling”) across many diﬀerent issues, reducing enforcement of the constraint
to one among many concerns. Such compromises could also involve intertemporal exchange
of favors: when A abstains from supporting the punishment of B, the latter is expected to
reciprocate in the future. Arguably, this is one aspect of what has happened in the EU Council
when sanctions against France and Germany in connection with the SGP where repeatedly
delayed (see, for example, Calmfors, 2005, pp. 31-32, 52–53). At the other extreme, sanctions
might be imposed by an independent body of experts, or a court, that simply follows pre-
speciﬁed rules. In this scenario, the incentive problems would typically be smaller, since such a
body has less scope for compromises across a broad spectrum of issues.
A political body operating under a discretionary regime may be particularly inclined to delay
or even abstain from imposing sanctions if they are regarded as draconian. In that respect, the
severity of the punishment does not only depend on the economic costs, but also on negative
political repercussions. In the case of ﬁnes, for example, policy makers may suﬀer more from
the loss of political reputation due to the “political drama” caused by the payment of a ﬁne,
than by the ﬁne itself. Of course, from an economic-theory point of view, a ﬁne is equivalent to
a discontinuous tax function. From a legalistic point of view, in contrast, only ﬁnes represent
punishments of violations of binding restrictions. To the extent that the general public and the
media holds a legalistic view, violation of a constraint, and the payment of a ﬁne, therefore spurs
much worse publicity than payment of a tax23, and a government is likely to ﬁght tooth and
nail to avoid formal punishment, not least by manipulating the statistics.
The political drama associated with ﬁnes is accentuated by their abruptness, i.e., by the fact
that a small change in the constrained variable triggers a large punishment. In the context of the
SGP, such abruptness is likely to be regarded as unreasonable or unfair not only by the country
concerned and its government, but also by other governments that are supposed to initiate the
sanctions. With a smooth tax function, such problems may not arise to the same extent. A
tax therefore mitigates two problems associated with the enforcement of SGP-type constraints,
one related to the perception of ﬁnes as punishments, the other to the abrupt consequences of
violations.
23An arrangement built on rewards for non-violators as opposed to ﬁnes for violators might mitigate the political
drama. Naturally, this would require that more revenue is raised or other expenditures cut.
14In light of these concerns, escape clauses and delays in the SGP (in particular after the
revisions in the Fall of 2005), might be regarded as attempts to strengthen the credibility of
the Pact. In particular, one might argue that the presence of escape clauses makes it less
likely for a country to be punished when this is unreasonable, for instance because of economic
events beyond the government’s control. The problem with this is, however, that suﬃciently
“reasonable” escape clauses would have to be very vague. This, in turn, opens Pandora’s box of
even more elaborate bargaining on whether sanctions should be imposed or not, and whether the
process should be delayed or not. What remains is a dilemma: Both very rigid constraints and
constraints subject to escape clauses are unlikely to be implemented in a discretionary regime
and thus, are not credible.
Consider next the violator’s incentive to conform with sanctions. In our view, there appear
to be two forces in the context of EMU inducing a violator to obey: norms and the threat
of losing some beneﬁts of membership in EMU. Social norms (in society at large or in one’s
peer group) and internalized norms work through utility losses for the violators, either in terms
of reduced status or shame (in the case of social norms) or bad conscience or guilt (in the
case of internalized norms). For instance, politicians in government might want to avoid being
considered an “outcast” and thus feel obliged to obey supranationally imposed constraints.
If the general public is suﬃciently anxious that constraints be obeyed, the inﬂuence of social
norms may be accentuated by the threat of publicity of a violation. This points to a potentially
important role played by the media and prestigious authorities such as an international court.
The proposal mentioned above by Fat´ as et al. (2003) to create a “Sustainability Council for
EMU”, with the task of reporting its assessment of ﬁscal policies of member states to the
public and the European Parliament, builds on exactly this notion of discouragement of “rule”
violations via public awareness and pressure. (As we mentioned before, such pressure might be
boosted by requirements that the assessment should be presented to and discussed by the relevant
national parliament, and that the governments should have to respond to it.) Similarly, the
European Commission has emphasized the role of peer pressure to enforce the SGP (Commission
of the European Communities, 2004).
If the general public is not suﬃciently interested in a government’s conduct, or if the public
actually encourages a government to violate a constraint, then social norms lose their force.
In that case, the necessary pressure must come from other countries. Ultimately, then, it is
the threat to be excluded from some beneﬁts of membership that can enforce obedience to the
constraint. For example, a country’s voting rights might be limited, or transfer payments might
be cut down if the violator is a net recipient of transfers. Naturally, this threat is less severe
for a larger country, in particular if it is a net ﬁnancial contributor. This might be one reason
for the relatively stricter adherence to the enforcement procedures of the SGP against Portugal
than against France and Germany (see, for example, the discussion in Calmfors, 2005, p. 30).
4 Concluding Remarks
The design of institutional constraints on ﬁscal policy makers such as SGP must be based on an
assessment of the problems the constraints are supposed to solve. At the same time, such design
must account for the fact that politicians rather than benevolent guards of citizens’ interest take
policy decisions.
If the basic purpose of the SGP is to keep international spillover eﬀects in check, then correc-
tive taxes on variables associated with these spillovers constitute the most appealing response.
15Compared with the SGP’s legalistic approach based on debt or deﬁcit ceilings and punishments
in case of violations of these ceilings, tax-subsidy programs would tend to improve both eﬃ-
ciency and, due to reduced political drama, enforceability. Such tax-subsidy programs would
need to be simple in order for them to be operational and politically implementable. In par-
ticular, tax rates would have to be uniform across countries, and levied on a small set of easily
measurable variables such as deﬁcit and debt levels or national inﬂation rates, weighted by GDP.
With regards to policy-induced spillover eﬀects arising due to the ECB’s lack of commitment,
strengthening the credibility of the ECB—as far as this is possible—would constitute the most
direct solution to the problem.
If the objective is instead to correct for domestic policy failures, increased transparency
constitutes the natural response. Fixed debt or deﬁcit ceilings are another possibility but they
may imply too large a loss of policy ﬂexibility—assuming that they can be enforced at all.
Procedural rules or limited delegation of ﬁscal powers to fully accountable committees may help
resolve the fundamental conﬂict between policy ﬂexibility and the ambition to counteract policy
failures.
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